Rethinking the Iraq War by Stiltner, Brian
Sacred Heart University
DigitalCommons@SHU
Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Faculty
Publications Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies
3-2006
Rethinking the Iraq War
Brian Stiltner
Sacred Heart University, stiltnerb@sacredheart.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/rel_fac
Part of the American Politics Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, Ethics and
Political Philosophy Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, Peace and Conflict
Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@SHU.
For more information, please contact ferribyp@sacredheart.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stiltner, B. (2006). Rethinking the Iraq War. Journal of Lutheran Ethics, 6(3). Retrieved from https://www.elca.org/JLE/Articles/611
Rethinking the Iraq War  
Brian Stiltner, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor and Chairperson 
Dept. of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies 
Sacred Heart University 
Fairfield CT 06825  
[1] In an article in JLE in March 2003, I argued that the looming invasion of Iraq was justified 
under just war criteria. Some Christian public intellectuals had taken that stand, but very few 
academic Christian ethicists did-at least not publicly. Most American and international church 
bodies spoke out against the war. Starting in summer of 2003, after news reports about 
intelligence errors and the deepening insurgency, I began having doubts about the position I had 
taken. I had the benefit of carefully thinking through all aspects of the Iraq situation as well as 
the foundational theological and ethical issues by writing a book with my colleague David 
Clough. We structured parts of our book Faith and Force (to appear in early 2007 from 
Georgetown University Press) in the form of debate that obliged me to test my arguments for the 
war. Through this research and writing-as well as through teaching, talking, and praying-I have 
come to believe that my support for the war was factually and ethically mistaken. It wasn't easy 
for me to come to this insight, still less to admit my flawed arguments. But it is more important 
for me to follow the facts wherever they lead. It is more important to abide responsibly by the 
just war ethic that I espouse, even if that means changing my mind. I hope that what I have 
learned from rethinking my initial position will be instructive for those who want to preserve the 
integrity of the Christian just war tradition. 
[2] The factors that were decisive for my initial argument were the threat of Iraq's suspected 
"weapons of mass destruction" and the plight of Iraq's citizens under Saddam Hussein. I believed 
that together these two factors supported the case for war. In retrospect, each argument was 
partially flawed, and further undermined by revelations of the decisions made by the U.S. and 
U.K. Let me start with the WMD argument. It is clear that the threat of nuclear and other 
offensive weapons held by Iraq presented the most plausible reason under just war theory to 
consider a preemptive war, for imminent attack has long been an incontrovertible just cause. I 
agreed with the advocates for war that Iraq's likely preparations after it evicted weapons 
inspectors in 1998, its poor accounting for past programs and materiel, and its obstructions when 
inspectors did return constituted a serious risk. Before the summer of 2003, almost everyone 
thought there were WMD in Iraq. Without inspections, there was no way of knowing what the 
threat really was. 
[3] Even after the inspectors were readmitted in November 2002, Saddam was making it very 
difficult for them to do their work. It seemed likely that he would dodge and evade, providing 
just enough information to avoid serious Security Council sanction, and wait for the will of the 
international community to weaken, so that the inspections could be further cramped without 
consequence. In that scenario, the risk of his developing such weapons couldn't be put off 
indefinitely. In late February, Iraq was found to have missiles with a range greater than 90 
kilometers, which violated U.N. sanctions, and it resisted destroying them. Such developments, 
coupled with what the Bush and Blair administrations reported to the public about their 
intelligence, persuaded me that Saddam was hopelessly and dangerously recalcitrant. 
[4] Subsequent media investigations and studies by governmental and independent commissions 
have presented a dizzying picture of responsibility for intelligence faults. This much has become 
clear to me about the Bush and Blair administrations: (a) There were crucial flaws and many 
ambiguities in the intelligence they received; (b) they put pressure on the intelligence community 
to paper over ambiguities in the evidence and to make assessments that would bolster the case 
for war; and (c) they presented intelligence results to the public in exaggerated terms. Those who 
have repented of their initial support for the war on this ground can place a portion of the blame 
on the politicians and intelligence experts who had the actual evidence and assessments. I am not 
saying that there was no cause for serious concern, but that the decisionmaking in the face of 
ambiguous evidence was rash. And I wish I had been less rash in supporting the rush to "disarm" 
Iraq. 
[5] More than this, I believe there was a principled flaw in my support. I have come to see it as a 
weak argument to wage wars to eliminate speculative risks. The just war tradition has long 
allowed preemptive attacks on the basis of self-defense, but not preventive wars to preclude a 
future threat from emerging. A judgment as to whether the invasion of Iraq qualified as 
preemption or prevention depends both on keeping the conceptual distinction straight and getting 
the facts right. I never thought that I was arguing for preventive war, but I did blur the distinction 
by arguing that it was Saddam's non-cooperation that was the issue, rather than whatever 
evidence would be turned up by the inspections. It is just not right to put human beings in harm's 
way to prevent harms that might not even be there. 
[6] The second piece of my argument was humanitarian concern. Saddam Hussein was broadly 
acknowledged to be a dictator who wasted the resources of his country on self-aggrandizement; 
had his political enemies arrested and killed; brutally repressed his citizens; and had earlier 
developed and used chemical weapons against Kurds and Iranians. I thought such concerns 
should motivate the community of nations to do what was possible, legal, and just to change 
Iraq's leadership. The most common objection was that there was no current or imminent 
humanitarian crisis, such as a genocide. I was not persuaded then, and I am not now, that military 
intervention may justly occur only when genocide is ongoing or imminent. My humanitarian 
argument for war took a broad view: large-scale atrocities happened at certain points in the past, 
which deserved justice; Iraqi citizens faced ongoing low-level oppression and killing in the 
present; and future oppression and atrocities were all but certain to occur. The only response the 
world was marshalling were economic sanctions that were not changing Iraq's behavior but were 
taking a toll on civilians. 
[7] Still, the reasonable possibility of the situation getting worse rather than better should have 
given humanitarian advocates for war, like myself, greater pause. For me at that time, this 
humanitarian motive bolstered what was weak in the weapons argument, and vice versa. But now 
I realize that a partial case for war because of the weapons risk and a partial case for war under 
humanitarian reasons don't add up to an air-tight case for just war. Each of the causes proffered 
has to be reasonable with little doubt-something like 90 to 95 percent certain-and they can't be 
undermined by other just war criteria. And so, while I think a humanitarian intention for the war 
was ethically sound, a war on a humanitarian or any other grounds wouldn't be correct if the 
civilians of Iraq were likely to be worse-off afterward. 
[8] It is not at all clear that Iraqi citizens have been better off in the last three years. Because the 
"war on terror" has been prosecuted with too much stick and not enough carrot, and because of 
insufficient troop strength and poor post-war planning, we have seen the Iraqi insurgency grow 
in numbers and the death toll mount for both Iraqis and Americans. Yet there are grounds for 
hope, and I would be remiss not to mention that Iraq has seen real political progress over what it 
has known since Saddam's Baath party came to power in 1968-indeed, since the nation was 
created by Western powers almost 90 years ago. Iraqis voted in three significant, free elections in 
2005, an experience rare in the Middle East. Saddam and his henchmen will be tried by fellow 
Iraqis. Unlike some proponents, I cannot retroactively justify the war on these grounds, but it is 
nevertheless good to celebrate these changes. Do they point to a better future for Iraq? We have 
to hope that they do. 
[9] I am not talking about mere optimism, that is, wishful thinking, but a hope-filled trust in the 
human spirit and in God's ultimate purposes. The citizens of Iraq need not be enemies, and we 
must hope they will not be. The Sunnis are not a monolithic group: some did participate in the 
elections; some will see a point in casting their lot with a constitutional Iraq rather than with 
nihilism and violence. Shiites, though having suffered violence at the hands of Sunni political 
power, have not been vengeful for the most part, but have engaged the political process in order 
to overcome the past. 
[10] Likewise, America and the world need not be enemies, and we must hope we will not be. 
Americans need to learn from their mistakes and take a more humble approach to foreign 
relations. I believe that American citizens as a whole truly desire to help others-even, 
implausibly, with this war-but our image has been tarnished by flawed decisions and the refusal 
of our leaders to admit mistakes. It will take time and hard work to restore the luster of that 
image. In this effort, Christians should play a leading role. Even those of us who support just war 
theory must witness to hope by responding to Jesus' call to be peacemakers. 
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